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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE :MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COl\IPANY, a corporation; MOUNTAIN
FUEL SUPPLY C01\1PANY, a
corporation; and UTAH PO\VER AND
LIGHT COMP ANY, a corporation,
Case N o.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, · 12310
vs.
OGDEN CITY, a body corporation and
politic under the laws of the State of Utah,
Defendant-Respond rnt.

OF SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
AS AMICUS CURIAE

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiffs seeking
to <letermine the validity of an "in lieu of tax clause" of
franchise ordinances passed by Ogden City, which deeision will have catholic effect on similar ordinances of
other cities, including Salt Lake City.
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DISPOSITION OF LO\VER COURT
Salt Lake City adopts the statement of defendantrespondent' s brief.

RELIEF SOGGHT ON APPEAL
Salt Lake City seeks tu have the trial court's decision affirmed and have this court rule as a matter of
law that the governmental function of taxation may not
be imparied by one municipal legislative body as against
subsequently elected ones.

FACTS
Salt Lake City adopts by this reference the statement of facts of the parties; however, adds thereto the
following information:
1. Salt Lake City passed a franchise tax ordinance

imposing a two percent charge on the gross revenue of
the telephone company as a franchise fee for the privilege of using public property for its business purposes
on November 23, 1951, using similar wording as those
ordinances in the within action. See Bill 78 of 1951,
attached as Exhibit A.
2. Salt Lake City passed a franchise tax ordinance

imposing a two percent charge on the gross revenue of
.i\1ountain Fuel Supply Company as a franchise fee on
')

.....

Odober :27, 1953, under the similar wordin()'
as those
0
ordinances in the within action. See Bill 65 of 1953,
attached as Exhibit B.

a.

Salt Lake City passed a franchise tax ordinance
imposing a two percent charge on the gross revenue of
Utah Power & Light Company as a franchise fee on
January 10, 1951, under similar ·wording as those ordinances in the within action. See Bill 4 of 1951, attached as Exhibit C.
4. On June :26, 1 !..167, Salt Lake City passed an

ordinance imposing a seperate license tax on the three
public utilities, using similar wording to the tax in controversy in the within action. See Bill 38 of 1967, attached as Exhibit D. This additional and separate business reveune tax has been renewed each year since 1967.
See attached Exhibits E, F, and G.
5. Some eighteen years after the first Franchise

Ordinance was passed against Utah Power and Light
Company and l\iountain States Telephone Company,
and some two and one-half years after the business revenue tax was imposed by Salt Lake City in 1967, the
plaintiffs in the within suit served Salt Lake City with
a complaint identical in substance to the one before the
court in the within action. See case No. 192098 in the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
L'tah, attached as Exhibit H.

3

ARGU.l\IENT
POINT I
TAXATION IS A GOYERN.l\IENTAL
FUNCTION AND, AS SUCH, A CITY LEGISLATIVE BODY HAS NO PO\VER TO LIMIT
OR RESTRICT A SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATURE'S POYVER TO TAX; ANY CONTRACT
OR ORDINANCE PROVISION ATTEMPTING
TO RESTRICT A LEGISLATURE'S PO\iVER
TO TAX IS AN ULTRA VIRES ACT, CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY, AND ABSOLUTELY VOID ON ITS FACE.
In reality, there is only one issue in this case; that
issue is: "l\Iay one muncipal legislative body, either by
ordinance or contract, barter away or otherwise absolutely bind future legislatures regarding the governmental function of taxation?" Plaintiffs-appellants have
not affirmatively responded to the germaine policy and
underlying legal problems involved in resolving this
issue. Rather, they have avoided directly facing these
legal and public policy questions and have attempted to
cover them with a smokescreen of irrelevant material and
superficial case dicta. For example:
I. On page 14 of their brief, appellants note the

existence of this main issue and then, with a cavalier
waive of the pen, state:
"It is surprising that such contention is advanced bv defendant in view of the fact that the
additiona·l utility revenue tax was first enacted
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by the same city counsel [who passed the franchise ordinance} less than one month previous
to such enactment [enactment of the utility revenue license tax} . . ."
This statement, mind you, was made with full
knewledge that the identical issue was being raised by
appellants in the Third District Court against Salt Lake
City; however, in the Salt Lake City case, the Franchise
Ordinances were not passed by the same legislative body
that passed the subsequent business revenue license tax.
Rather, the latter revenue tax was passed by a legislative body some 18 years after the Franchise Ordinances
were passed. Further, appellants' quoted attempt to
impugn the Ogden City Council's decision to tax appellants is misleading; it is misleading because plaintiffs-appellants in the within case still seek a ruling that
will bind all power of the legislative bodies of both Salt
Lake City and Ogden City to tax plaintiffs-appellants
until the years 2003 and 2014, respectively. The effect
of a ruling affects the taxing power of Utah cities into
the 21st Century and extends long beyond the tenure of
one city legislative body. In point of fact, it most probably extends beyond the lifetimes of even the presently
elected legislators.
2. On pages 15 and 16 of plaintiffs-appellants' brief,

appellants cite 10-8-30 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and
case law to the effect that municipalities must uniformly tax a given class of taxpayers and may make reasonable exemptions from taxation. Appellants then step
adroitly from this truism and contend that the "in lieu"
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provision of the subject Franchise Ordinances are merely an exercise of that discretionary tax exemption power.
Hence, appellants contend that the lower court erred in
holding that one city legislature may not bind a future
legislature's taxing powers. See page 17 of .plaintiffs·
appellants' brief.
The conclusion of appellant!) is a total non-sequitor.
Appellants have very cleverly omitted diseussing that
such exemption or classification may, and in all liklihoo<l
will, be altered or changed by subsequent city legisla·
tures. To suggest that, because a legislative body may
exempt one from taxation or that it may tax reasonably
classified taxpayers, a subsequent legislative body may
not subsequently tax the exempted person or change
classifications simply does not follow in logic, reason, or
law. A taxing authority can and often does change tax·
payer classifications. A taxing authority can and often
does choose to tax a taxpayer who was previously not
taxed or was previously given an exemption. This argu·
ment of appellants suggesting the contrary to be true is
patently false. The real issue there is only one of reason·
able classification and of power to tax the previously ex·
empt or omitted taxpayer. Certainly, the appellants are
businesses subject to taxation by Utah cities under law.
See 10-8-80 and 10-8-39, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Obviously, this argument of appellants has no basis for
validity in Utah.
3. Appellants haYe cited a Utah Constitutional pro·
vision prohibiting the state legislature from granting a
right to eonstruct and operate a street railroad, tele·
6

graph, telephone or electrical plant \vithout first obtaining permission of the local authorities who control the
streets or highways to be used. See pages 17-18 of appellants' brief. Certainly, that Constitutional provision
preserves the rights of local authorities to permit or not
permit use of their streets by private business enterprises; however, it is respectfully submitted that no legal
or logical bridge can be drawn from that Constitutional
provision to the proposition that the city legislature of
the year 1953 can bar the city legislature of the year
2003 from imposing taxes on a given classification of
taxpayers.
Obviously, the intent and clear meaning of Section
8, Article XII of the Utah Constitution, quoted by appellants, merely preserves some powers and rights of
local government as against the state. It cannot possibly
be stretched so far as to vest the right in one city legislature to sell governmental functions and powers. In fact,
this Constitutional provision has been construed to permit the increasing of rates by the public service commission contrary to those rates agreed upon in Franchise
Ordinances with Salt Lake City. Salt La1.ce City v. Utah
Lir;ht
Traction Co., 52 Utah 210, 173 P. 556, 559
(HHS); see also Murray City v. Utah
Traction
Co., 56 Utah 437, 191 P. 421 (1920). These cases specifically held that this Constitutional provision did not
gfre the cities the power, either expressly or by implicatiin, to ever fix utility rates by Franchise Ordinance.
Certainlv then, that Constitutional provision cannot be
.'
read to vest one city legislature with the omnibus power
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to bar subsequent legislatures' taxing powers into the
21st Century.
Especially is this conclusion true in view of the clear
Utah law that municipalities have no powers not ex.
pressly granted to them by the legislature. This court
has stated:
"That the powers of the city are strictly limit·
ed to those expressly granted, to those necessary
or fairly implied in or incident to the powers
expressly granted, and to those essential to the
declared objects and purposes of the corpora·
tion, is settled law in this state." Stevenson v. Salt
Lake City, 7 Utah 2d 28, 317 P.2d 597, 598
(1959) quoting il'forgan v. Salt Lake City, 78
Utah 403, 3 P.2d 510, 511.
It is respectfully submitted that Section 10-8-14,_ Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, quoted at page 18 of appellants'
brief, is purely and simply a legislative codification of
the powers granted by the Utah Constitution, Section 8,
Article XII. These laws of Utah grant cities the power
to franchise private business organizations to provide
gas, telephone, sewer, water, transportation and elec·
trical services. However, appellants' attempt to read
them as vesting such a tremendous power in one city
legislature as to enable it to bind a future successor's
taxing powers, certainly cannot be done in Utah by such
vague implications and assumptions as appellants urge
upon the court. Such a power would have to be expressly
and unequivocally given, such as was done by the Michigan legislature in the cases appellants cite as authority
for their theory.
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For example, the first Michigan case cited, the 1889
case of City of Detroit v. Detroit City Ry., 43 N.\V. 447,
clearly stated that the decision turned on state enabling
legislation. In that case, state law had been amended to
allow cities to tax and enter into agreements with rail'ray companies. This amendment changed the previous
law that made taxes payable solely to the state treasury.
Further, the new law prohibited the construction of a
railway on any street without local permission and consent ..l\Iore importantly, however, the new law specifically provided:
" ... that after such consent shall have been
given, and accepted by the company or corporation to which the same is granted, such autliorities [local or municipal) shall make no regulations or conditions whereby the rights or franchises so granted shall be destroyed ..." City
of Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. Co., id at page 447.
(Emphasis added.)
The .Michigan Supreme Court noted the validity of the
above-quoted state statute and then stated that it was the
enabling state statute that bound the cities to the "in
lieu" provision of a franchise agreement. At page 448,
that court clearly said:
"Had there been no state specific tax prior to

1882, it is not at all likely that the cities wonld

have been allowed to fiiX' loca! ta.ixs indefinitely
b!! agreement." (Empasis added.)

Hence, it is clear that it was the specific state enabling statute which barred additional taxation after the
terms of a franchise contract made the franchise fee "in
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lieu" of all other city extractions. The Detroit case turned
solely on state law and not upon the issues of ultra vires
and public policy as are raised in the within action; that
is, the case was tried under a state law wholely different
from that here involved.
Virtually identical to the Detroit case, supra, is the
later .Michigan case of St. Ry. v. Common Council of
City of Detroit, 85 N. \V. 96 (Mich. 1901), which case is
relied upon so heavily by appellant. The relevant issue in
this case, like the Detroit case, tm·ned solely on the same
.Michigan law which expressly prohibited cities from altering the terms of executed franchise ordinances. Here,
the lVlichigan Supreme Court said:
"The [state] legislature is authorized to impose specific taxes. It may do so or not do so as
it deems best. It may authorize cities to do so,
... The organic act [Michigan state law prohibiting amendment of franchise ordinance terms}
under which this street railway was organized
compelled the defendant to submit to such terms
in regard to local taxation as it should be able
to make with the city ... This was the general
law, but it left the city to impose or omit a special
tax in each particular case as it should see fit. ..
It was not a question of -wisdom but of power:"
Detroit Citizens St. Ry. Co. v. Common Council,
id at page 106. (Emphasis added)
There exists no Utah law which expressly or by implication vests cities with the powers or restrictions imposed
by the lVIichigan legislature. Therefore, neither of these
.Michigan cases have any similarity to Utah statutory or
case law. They are void of any precedent value in this
case.

10

4. The Utah case of Salt Lake City v. Utah Light
and Ry. Co., 45 Utah 50, 142 P. 1067 ( 1914) is cited by

appellants as authority for their position that cities may
barter away taxing powers of subsequent legislatures.
However, this case was an appeal of a criminal action
and, in a discussion of whether an ordinance was valid,
this court expressly limited its holding to the conclusion
that the taxing ordinance in question was not equally
assessed. The court held:
"Equality, therefore, become;s a safeguard
against, if not an absolute prevention of, excessive, oppressive taxation ... For the reason last
stated, we are required to declare the ordinance
in question invalid." Salt Lake City v. Vt. Light
& Ry. Co., id at pages 1071, 1072.
Obviously, the holding of that case has nothing to
<lo with the issue of bartering away taxing powers of
goyernment as presented in the within suit. Regarding
this point, the court clearly said:
"At the outset it should be noted that there is
no express provision in any of the so called franchises, or in the ordinances under which appellants claim right herein ... whereby Salt Lake
City has either bartered or granted, or surrendered its right to impose any license or occupation tax upon appellent which may be permitted
under our constitution or statutes." Salt Lake
City v. Utah Light & Ry. Co., id at page 1068.
(Emphasis added)
Therefore, appellants' citation from that case at page 11
of this brief is pure obiter dictum. That case has totally
<lifferent facts from the within action, and the court was

11

not faced with the policy and legal questions presented
here. Certainly, this court cannot be bound by 1914 dicta.

:no

5. In the case of City of St. Louis v. United lly.,
U.S. 266 ( 1908), cited by appellants, the court up-

held the power of the city to impose additional taxation

on the franchisee. The references made by appellants to
statements of that court are to pure 1908 dictum. Likewise is the case of City and County of Denver v. Stenzer,
295 F. 908 (8 Cir. 1924) cited by appellants. These
cases cannot be given authoritative, precedential status
for the issues now before the court. They simply did not
seriously consider the problems here presented.
6. Appellant cites 10-8-14, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, (Supp. 1969), in conjunction with 78-34-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, and a 1901 Michigan case in a

sentimental plea arguing that the services rendered by
appellants are essential to the public welfare. Therefore,
appellant urges, a municipal ordinance permitting the
use of city streets for their own business purposes should
also be read to prohibit any additional taxation against
them for fifty years. There is no allegation that Mountain States Telephone, Utah Power & Light Co., or
_l\llountain Fuel Supply Co. are benevolent or charitable
organizations, and just why a corporation who provides
beneficial services to the public should be given some special immunity from the taxing power of the city is not
discussed by appellants. It is respectfully submitted that
every business enterprise can claim special benefit and
public service to the
by their existence. Appellants have neither shown nor alleged any logical reason
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why they, as enterprises, are deserving or in need of
special immunity from taxation increases to which every
other taxpayer is subject.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that appellants'
position has avoided discussing the ultra vires and public
policy issues raised by defendant-respondent in Point I
of its brief. Appellants' case really rests upon one Nevada case and upon the syllogism that:
a. The ordinance granting appellants franchises are
contracts.
b. The contract clauses of the United States and
Utah Constitutions require enforcement of all contracts,
regardless of public policy considerations barring one
city legislature from binding its successors in the exercise
of governmental powers.
c. Therefore, the additional revenue tax is illegal,
as it is contrary to the "in lieu" provision of the Franchise
Ordinance; that is, the original contract between the city
and the appellants.
One must question what consideration was given the
city for the franchise ordinance and what facts turn those
ordinances into a contract, not subject to amendment.
However, the major faulty premise of appellants' brief
is, of course, the one which depends upon the principle
that the Contract Clause of the Utah and United States
Constitutions demand that the city cannot pass additional taxes against appellants because of the "in lieu"
i1r0Yision of the city ordinance.

13

Public policy considerations have often limited the
power of contract. For example, no legislative assurance
that the power of eminent domain would not be exercised could prevent subsequent action of taking corporate property upon the payment of just compensation.
JV est River Bridge Co. v. Di.r, 6 How. 507 ( 1848);
Penn.Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 ( 1918). A
:Mississippi grant of a charter to operate a lottery did not
bar the application of a latter law barring lotteries under the contract clause. Regarding this point, Justice
\\Taite said:
"All agree the legislature cannot bargain away
its police power, ... " Stone v. Missis."lippi, 101

U.S. 814 ( 1880).

A later U. S. court expressed this principle as follows:
"It is settled that neither the 'contract' clause
nor the 'due process' clause has the effect of overriding the power of the state to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure
the llealth, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community; that this power
can neither be abdicated nor bargained away,
and is inalienable even by express grant; ... "
Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548
(1914).

Relevant to the within action, the case law is clear
and overwhelming that it is contrary to public policy and
an ultra vires act when one legislature attempts to impair the governmental functions and powers of subsequent legislatures. These governmental functions and
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powers are merely held in trust by one legislature and
must be passed unencumbered to subsequent legislatures.
Therefore, any attempt to contract or barter away those
governmental powers is an ultra vires act and contrary
to public policy-hence illegal and unenforceable.
This point has been noted in defendant-respondent's brief, Point I, which is herewith adopted by reference. However, the following supplemental cases and
recitations may also be of assistance to the court:
1. In Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 166

A.2d 278 (Pa. 1960), the court held the statute creating
a Parking Authority gave it power to hire employees,
but did not confer upon it the power to contract away its
power to discharge. At pages 282-283, the court stated:

"In the performance of sovereign or governmental, as distinguished from business or proprietary, functions, no legislative body, or municipal board having legislative authority, can take
action which will bind its successors. McCormick
v. Hanover Township, 246 Pa. 169, 92 A. 195;
Moore v. Luzerne County, 262 Pa. 216, 105 A.
94; Born v. Pittsburgh, 266 Pa. 128, 109 A. 614.
It cannot enter into a contract which will extend
beyond the term··for which the members of the
body were elected."
2. In First National Bank v. City of Emmetsburg,

138 N.,V. 451 (Iowa, 1912) at page 455, the court

stated:
"It seems to be correctly held generally that
a city has two classes of powers, which have been
as follows: 'A city has two classes of power
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-the one legislative, public, governmental, in
the exercise of which it is the sovereignty and
governs its people; the other, proprietary, quasi
private, conferred upon it, not for the purpose
of governing its people but for the private advantage of the inhabitants of the city itself as a
legal personality. In the exercise of the powers
of the former class, it is governed by the rule
here invoked. In their exercise it is ruling its
people, and is bound to transmit its powers of
government to its successive sets of officers unimpaired.' " (Emphasis added); cited in Bair v.
Layton City Corporation, 6 Utah 138, 307 P.2d
895 ( 1957)

3. In Leedigh v. Nebraska City, 292 N.,V. 155
(Neb., 1940), the Nebraska court had a case involving

the purchase of a park in installment payments. At page
117, the court stated:

"In the case of strictly governmental powers,
the city officers or commissioners are trustees,
and they may make no grant or contract which
will bind the municipality beyond the terms of
their office. See Omaha Water Co. v. City of
Omaha, supra. 'l_lhis was held because they shall
not unlawfully circumscribe the legislative
powers of their successors. In their e,vercise) the
city is ruling its people and is bound to transmit
its powers of government to its successive officers
itnimpaired." (Emphasis added.)
4. In Cit/) Council of Augusta v. Richmond Co.,
173 S.E. 140 (Ga. 1934), the court was presented an

issue involving a contract to supply water for an indefinite future time to a jail and courthouse deeded by the
city to the county. The Georgia court held the contract
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ultra vires and not enforceable against subsequent councils of the municipality. \Ve quote from page 142 thereof
as follows:
"ln Horkan v. City of .Moultrie, 136 Ga. 561,
71 S.E. 785, it was said: 'A council of a muni-

cipality cannot make a binding contract by which
it undertakes to obligate the municipality to furnish 'free of charge,' for an indefinite time in the
future, sufficient water for the closets in a given
building situated within the corporate limits, in
consideration of the owner of the building allowing the municipality to lay its sewers through
his land. Such a contract, being ultra vires and
void, could not be ratified by the continued use,
under the contract, of the sewer through the land
by the municipality; nor would the benefit thereby received estop it from subsequently setting
up the invalidity of the contract.' In the opinion
Chief Justice Fish said: 'We have found no case,
however, that would tend to support a contract
made by a city council in behalf of the municipality to furnish water indefinitely to one of its
citizens, in consideration of his permitting it to
lay a sewer through his land. Succeeding councils would necessarily have the power, we think,
to change the water rates from time to time as
circumstances might require or justify, in order
to obtain sufficient revenue to maintain its watersystem on the one hand, and, on the other,
in order to serve all its patrons at reasonable
rates and on equal terms. To allow one council
to legally bind the city by a contract of the kind
here in question might so tie the hands of its
successors as to result in great injury to the municipality and to the public. * * * Power in a
municipalitv of making and changing by ordinancc water rates from time to time) whenever
1
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necessary to protect tne city in its revenues and
to enable it to furnish to all on equal terms and
at reasonable rates, is a legislative or governmental power, and therefore cannot be legally
bargained or bartered away by one COlLncil, so
as to forever deprive 8lLcceeding councils of the
right to exercise it." (Emphasis added.)
5. In Smith v. 1llitchell, 1 S.2d 765 (-Miss. 1941),
the .Mississippi court held that the mayor and board of
aldermen could not bind subsequent administrations to
settle or compromise suits or claims that might arise in
the future. At page 767, the court said:

"Nor could it bind a subsequent administration beyond such attempted delegation of authority as to suits that might be instituted during
the ensuing term without its consent. It was held
in the case of Edwards Hotel and City St. R.
Co. v. City of Jackson, 96 Miss. 546, 51 So. 802,
that each .Mayor and Board of Aldermen may
in their discretion determine when the powers
conferred upon them by law shall be exercised
and that one mayor and board of aldermen may
not bind their successors to carry out contracts
made by the former seeking to tal-Le away from
the latter rights and powers conferred upon them
by law." (Emphasis added.)
6. In Plant Food Co. v. City of Charlotte, 199

S.E.

712, (N.C. 1938), the North Carolina court poignantly
stated at page 713:
" ... where governmental discretionary powers
are involved a board can make no contract which
·would bind its successors in office with respect
to the exercise of the discretion . . . Amongst
the powers generally conceded to be accompanied
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by such governmental discretion, and which cannot be suspended or controlled by contract are
usually classed as legislative powers of the governing body - the power ... to levy taxes, make
Msessments and the like." (Emphasis added.)
For similar holdings see City of Douglas v. Cartrett,
137 S.E.2d 358 (Ga.App. 1964); Born v. City of Pittsburgh, 109 A. 614 (Pa. 1920); cases cited in defendantrespondent's brief, Point I.
Thus, it is clear that virtually every court directly
considering the problem has held that governmental
functions may not be alienated, bartered or conveyed
beyond the term of office of one municipal legislature.
Certainly, there exists no more central governmental
power or function than the one of taxation. Hence, this
power of taxation cannot be alienated by one city legislature against another.
The only case cited by appellants which comes close
to presenting a contrary holding is the Nevada case of
City of North LM Vegas v. Central Telephone Co., 460
P .2d 835 (Nev. 1969) . In addition to respondent's comments at page six of its brief, amicus would add that the
Nevada court apparently construed the 5 percent charge
to be a license tax additure for the privilege of the franchise rights. The Franchise provided that the telephone
company would pay "for supenision and inspection and
not for rennue" I percent of its gross revenue in lieu of
the charges made for a license fee, which payment was
considered a license fee. The court made this clear when
it def incd the problem as follows:
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"On July 1, 1968, the city adopted Ordinance
No. 371 . . . which undertook 'to increase the
public utility license fees . .. ' " City of North
Las Vegas v. Central Telephone Co., id at page
835. (Emphasis added.)
Then the court noted that the central issue was one
of impairing the obligation of contracts as prohibited bv
the State and Federal Constitutions. The court refined
this issue by noting:
"The issue arises by reason of the provision of
the franchise that the one percent charge thereunder was in Lieu of any charges for a license.''
City of North Las Vegas v. Central Telephone
Co., id at page 836. (Emphasis added.)
Thereafter, the court importantly held the 5 percent
charge was an increase of that license fee. At page 836,
the court said :
" ... the five percent charge in the latter ordinance was imposed as a license fee."
Thus, although that case lacks a recital of sufficient facts, particularly about Nevada enabling legislation, to make it of much value in relationship to Utah
law, it is obvious to the writer that the issue in that Nevada case involved an additional fee for the franchise
privilege. Contrarywise, the case before the bar presents
a fact situation where a franchise fee was imposed under
authority of 10-8-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and
subsequently the city imposed a business license tax under authority of a separate statute, 10-8-80, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. The within action has nothing to do
20

with adding to the fee for franchise rights and privileges.
ln point of fact, the tax in question is a business revenue
tax, totally divorced from the franchise fee. Therefore,
the Nevada case cannot be read as sound precedent for
the prohibition of an additional tax which would not be
au additional fee for franchise rights and privileges.
The Nevada court was apparently not faced or presented with the broad issue of the powers of one city legislature to sell the governmental powers of taxation.
That issue is not even mentioned, let alone discussed.
The Nevada court was apparently dealing with the proprietary function of selling franchise rights in public
property for a given sum, which it held could not be
raised. If the decision has any other reading, it is patently incorrect and contrary to every judicial holding the
writer has found relevant to the issue before the court.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the appellants have failed to show good reason, logic or law to
rebut the long line of case law holding that governmental
functions must be passed on by one legislature unimpaired to the next. This rule is imperative for the continuation of government; otherwise, one legislature could
make totally impotent subsequent legislatures. The
power to raise revenue in these times of cancerous inflation is at the very heart of city existence, especially in
Utah where city revenue sources are so circumscribed by
state law. It is respectfully submitted that this court
should reaffirm its statements in Bair v. Layton Citv
Corporation; it should hold that the power of taxation
Yested in Utah cities must be handed free of strings to
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each newly elected legislatiYe body and, further, that an
ordinance purporting to divest other future legislative
bodies of such powers is an ultra vires act and contrary
to public policy.
This position is especially justified in the withio
action because the appellants can show absolutely no
damage through imposition of the tax. This court has
specifically held that local excise, license and franchise
costs may be, and in fact have been, billed directly to
customers of the appellants. They are costs in addition
to any rate established by the public service commission
for their monopoly service. Ogden City v. Public Service
Comm., 123 Utah 437, 260 P.2d 751 ( 1953). Voiding
the tax in question would accomplish nothing for the
appellants. Such action would merely void powers of
taxation vested in Utah cities under 10-8-80, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, and bankrupt impoverished Utah municipalities.

SUMMARY
Utah law limits the powers of cities and their legislators to those rights and powers expressly given by
the state. There exists no law granting one municipal
legislative body the power or right to alienate, sell, barter, or in any way transfer the taxing power or authority
of the city. Therefore, the attempt of one legislature to
bind, for 50 years in the future, the taxing power of subsequent city legislatures through a franchise ordinance
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is an ultra vires act. As such, the attempt is void and unenforceable; therefore, the subsequent business license
tax against these appellants is valid.
Also, it is contrary to public policy to permit one
legislative body to sell or alienate governmental functions. These functions are powers held in trust and are
passed to each new legislature unimpaired. This rule is
fundamental to the continuation of government; a rule
of law otherwise would permit one legislature to paralize all subsequent ones and void the power of citizens to
change the direction of government through the elective
process. The power to tax is an essential goyernmental
function; therefore, the attempt of one city legislature
to alienate the power to tax appellants for 50 years is
contrary to public policy and, hence, invalid and unenforceable.
Further, these plaintiffs-appellants have in no way
Leen prejudiced by imposition of the license tax subject
of this dispute. The license taxes and franchise fees subject of this dispute are merely added to appellants
eharges for services rendered. Hence, they do not affect
the operating costs or profit position of the plaintiffsappellants, or either of them.
In conclusion, this court should rule that the Franehise Ordinance passed under authority of 10-8-14, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, does not and cannot vitiate the
power of Utah municipalities to impose a license tax
against appellants under authority vested in them by 108-80 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The court should
'
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affirm the lower court and dismiss plaintiffs-appellants'
action.
Respectfully submitted,
JACK L. CRELLIN
Salt Lake City Attorney
ROGER F. CUTLER
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Salt Lake City Corporation
101 City and County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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EXHI.BIT "A"
AN ORDINANCE
AN OHDINANCE granting to THE .MOuN'l'AlN STATES TELEPHONE & TELEGHAPH CO.MP ANY, its successors and assigns, the
right and privilege to eonstruct, erect, operate, and maintain over and under the streets, alleys and public ways,
wires, cables, and underground conduits, and eoild{ict
a general telephone business.
Ile it ordained by the Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City, Utah:
Ile it ordained by the lloarcl of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City, Utah:
SECTION 1. There is hereby granted to The
.Jlountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company, a
corporation, its successors and assigns, for a period of
fifty years from and after the effective date of the ordinance, the right and privilege to construct, erect, operate
and maintain, in, upon, along, across, above, under and
oYer the streets, alleys, public ways, and public places
now or hereafter laid out or dedicated, and all extensions thereof and additions thereto in Salt Lake City,
poles, wires, cables, underground conduits, manholes,
and other telephone :fixtures necessary or proper for
the maintenance and operation in said City of a telephone exchange and lines connected therewith; pro,·ided, however, that no poles or other fixtures shall be
plaeed where the same will interfere with any gas lamp,
electric light, water hydrant, water main or sewer main;
and a 11 such poles or other :fixtures placed or any street
slrn 11 be placed at the outer edge of the sidewalk and
inside the curb line and those placed in alleys shall be
placed close to the line of the lot abutting on said alleys
and then in such a manner as not to interfere with the
usual traYel on said streets, alleys, and public ways; and
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provided, further, that underground conduits, cables,
and other facilities of the Company shall be located and
constructed in such manner as not to interfere with the
facilities of the City or those of other public utilities, and
the Company, before constructing any such facilities,
shall furnish to the City Engineer complete drawings
of any such construction, and the City shall keep and
maintain permanent records of the location and character of the Company's underground facilities and their
relationship to those of the City and other public utilities.
SECTION 2. The said Company shall at all times
during the life of this franchise be subject to all lawful
exercise of the police power by the City and to such
reasonable regulation thereunder as the City may by
ordinance hereafter provide. It is expressly understood
and agreed by and between the said Company and the
City that said Company shall have the City harmless
from all loss sustained by the City on account of any
suit, judgment, execution, claim, or demand whatsoever resulting from negligence on the part of said
Company in the construction and maintenance of its
telephone system in the City. The City shall notify the
said Company's representative within five ( 5) days after
the presentation o fany claim or demand either by suit
or otherwise made against the City on account of any
ne gligence as aforesaid on the part of said Company.
SECTION 3. The City shall have the privilege
during the life of this franchise, where aerial construction exists, of maintaining, free of charge, upon the
poles of the Company within the City limits, wires and
pole fixtures necessary for police and fire alarm systems.
The City shall have the further privilege, within said
period, of maintaining, free of charge, police and fire
alarm wires and cables in only those underground conduits of the Company presently used by the City. Such
wires, fixtures and cables shall be constructed and main-
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tained to the satisfaction of the Company in the number prescribed by it and in accordance with its speciti<.:at10n. The City, in its use and maintenance of such
wires, fixtures, and cables, shall at all times comply
with the rules and regulations of the Company so that
there may be a minimum danger of contact or conflict
between the wires, fixtures, and cables of the Company
and the wires, fixtures, and cables used by the City.
It is further agreed, in order to avoid danger to
life and property, that the above privilege is granted
only upon condition that no police or fire alarm wires
or other fixtures shall mbe placed upon poles carrying
electric light or power wires without the consent of the
Company, nor shall any wires or cables be exposed
without the consent of the Company to the danger of
contact or conflict with any conductor carrying a voltag egreater than the normal telephone voltage. The
City shall be solely responsible for all damage to persons or property arising out of the construction or maintenance of said wires, fixtures, and cables, and shall save
the Company harmless from all claims and demands
whatsoever arising out of the attachment, maintenance,
carge, or removal of said wires, fixtures, and cables tu
or from the poles of underground conduits of the Company. In case of rearrangement of the Company plant
or removal of poles, fixtures, or conduits, the City shall
care for or remove its own wires, fixtures, and cables,
and shall save the Company harmless from any damage
to persons or property arising out of the construction
or removal or failure to remove its wires, cables, or other
fixtures.

SECTION 4. Any peson or corporation desiring
to move a building or other improvement along, or to
make any unusual use of the streets, alleys, and public
wars of the City which, in movement or use, would
iuterfere with the poles, wires, or other fixtures of the
Company or the City, shall first give notice to the said
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Company or the City, as the case may be, ancl shall
pay to the Company or the City, as the case mav be, a
sum sufficient to cover the expenses and damage incident to the cutting, altering, and moving of the wires
or other fixtures of the Company or the City, and before
a permit is given by the City therefor, the applicant
shall present a receipt from the Company showing such
payment. Thereupon ,the Company, upon presentation
of the said permit, shall, within forty-eight ( 48) hours
thereafter provide for and do such citing, altering, and
moving the wires or other fixtures of said Company
as may be necessary to allow such moving or other
unusual use of the streets, alleys, and public ways of
the City.
SECTION 5. It is expressly understood and
agreed by the City that the enactment of this franchise
and its acceptance by the Company was and is made
upon the express condition and undertsanding that
neither the said enactment nor the grant or acceptance
of this franchise shall constitute a waiver upon the part
of said Company of any rights or claims had or made
by said Company with respect to the occupancy of the
streets, alleys, and public places of the City, under
the law of the Territory of Utah and under the constitutional and general statutes of the State of Utah,
nor shall anything in this franchise in any wise prej udice or impair any rights or claims existing independently of this franchise of said Company or its predecessors or succesors with respect to the construction,
operation, and maintenance, either before or after the
life of this franchise, of a telephone system in said
SECTION ti. As a further consideration for this
grant, the Company agrees to pay into the treasury
of the City a sum equal to two per cent (2%) of tlic
gross revenue per annum derived by said Company
from all local exchange service revenue received from
subscribers located within the City of Salt Lake and
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directly connected with the switchboard or switchboards
of said Company located in said City.
'Vithin sixty (60) days and after the first days of
January and July, 1952, and within sixty ( 60) days
after the first days of January and July of each calendar year thereafter, the Company shall file with the
Treasurer of said City a report of its revenues as above
described for the preceding six months' period, which
report shall, in addition to the amoun tof revenue, show
a computation of the tax due. The amount of the tax
so determined shall be
within thirty ( 30) days
after filing of subject report. The Treasurer of said
City shall determine the accuracy of the tax computation, and if he finds any errors, he shall report the same
to the Company for correction. If the tax as paid is
found to be deficient, the Company shall promptly
remit the difference, and if the tax as paid be found
excessive, the City shall promptly refund the difference. The records of the Company pertaining to such
report shall be open for inspection by the Board of
Commissioners or its duly authorized representative at
all reasonable hours upon the giving of reasonable
notice of its intention to inspect such records for the
purpose of verifying subject report.
SECTION 7. In consideration of the Company's
making the payments hereinabove provided iii. Section
6, it is expressly understood and agreed by the City
and the Company that the payments so provided in
said Section 6 hereof shall be in lieu of any and all other
franchise, occupation, privilege, license, pole, wire, instrument, excise, revenue, or similar taxes, and all other
exactions (except ad valorem property taxes and special
assessments for local improvements) upon the the revenue, property, poles, wires, instruments, conduits, pipes,
fixtures, or other appurtenances of said Company, and
all other property or equipment of said Company, or
any part thereof, including but not limited to any tax
0
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levies, eharges, assessments, or fees purporting to be
imposed by that certain ordinance adopted by the City
Council of Salt Lake City, Territory of Utah, on .Jlarch
'27, 1894, and approved by the .Mayor on April 2,
1894, and that certain ordinance amending and reenacting Sections 396 and 397 of the Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City of 1903, passed by the City Council
September 29, 1908, and approved by the .Jlayor October 1, mos and said payments shall further be in lieu
of furnishing free telephone service or free space on
overhead construction for police and fire alarm systems
or duct space for said police and fire systems other than
is expressly provided for in this franchise.
SECTION 8. This ordinance shall be deposited
in the office of the City Recorder of Salt Lake City
and shall be published once in a daily newspaper published within said City within seven ( 7) days after such
filing, and shall be in full force and effect upon the
filing by said Company with the Board of Commissioners of an unconditional acceptance thereof in writing which shall be filed within thirty ( 30) days after
the passage and approval of the ordinance. 'Vithin ten
( 10) days after the filing of said acceptance, the City
Recorder, by letter addresed to the Secretary of said
Company at Denver, Colorado, shall acknowledge the
receipt of said acceptance.
SECTION 9. That certain ordinance adopted by
the City Council of Salt Lake City, Territory of Utah,
on
27, 1894, and approved by the .Mayor on
April 2, 1894, and that certain other ordinance amending and re-enacting Sections 396 and 397 of the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City of 1903, passed by the
City Council September 29, 1908, and
by
the Mayor October 17, 1908, and all other ordmances
and parts of ordinances in conflict herewith are hereby
expressly repealed.
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Passed and adopted by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, this 21st day of November,
1951.

L. C. ROMNEY
Temporary Chairman.
F. BITNER
City Recorder.

(SEAL)
BILL NO. 78
Published November 24, 1951

EXHIBIT "B"
AN ORDINANCE
AN ORDINANCE GRANTING TO MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS, A FRANCHISE
FOR THE CONTRUCTION, OPERATION,
LA YING, MAINTENANCE AND REP AIR OF
A SYSTEM: OF GAS MAINS AND SUPPLY
AND DISTRIBUTION PIPES, TOGETHER
\VITH ALL NECESSARY OR PROPER
FIXTURES AND APPURTENANCES, AND REPEALING A CERTAIN
FRANCHISE ORDINANCE HERETOFORE
GRANTED TO THE PREDECESSORS OF
SAID COlVIPANY, AND ALSO REPEALING A
CERTAIN ORDINANCE RELATING TO THE
LICENSING OF PERSONS OR CORPORATIONS WHO ENGAGE IN THE SELLING
OF NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL GAS IN
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH.
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Ile it ordained by the Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City, Utah:
Section 1. There is hereby granted to .Mountain
.Fud Supply Company, a corporation, its successon
and assigns (herein sometimes ca lied the "Company''),
for a period of fifty ( 50) years from and after the effectiYe date of this ordinance, the right, privilege and franchise to construct, operate, lay, maintain and repair in,
along, across and under the streets, alleys,
an<l public places now or hereafter laid out or dedicated,
and all extensions thereof and additions thereto, in Salt
Lake City, L'tah (herein sometimes called the "City"),
a system of gas mains, supply pipes and laterals, distribution and service pipes, together with all necessary
or proper equipment, fixtures and appurtenances, for
the purpose of supplying said City and the inhabitants
thereof, and persons and corporations beyond the corporate limits of said City, gas for light, heat, power and
other purposes for which the same may be used.
Section 2. All gas mains and pipes laid, operated
and maintained under this franchise shall be so laid,
placed or maintained as not to substantially impair or
interfere with the usefulness or use of such streets,
alleys, and public places or with water mains, pipes
or conduits of th eCity or with pipes or conduits of any
public serYice utility laid or constructed prior to the
laying or construction of the mains or pipes of the Company.
Section 3. The said Company shall at all times
during the life of this franchise be subject to all lawful
exercise of the police power by the City and to such
reasonable regulation thereunder as the City may by
ordinance hereafter provide. It is expressly understood
and agreed by and bebveen the said Company and the
City that said Company shall save the City harmless
from all loss sustained by the City on account of any
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suit, judgment, execution, claim, or demand whatsoever resulting from negligence on the part of said Company in the construction and maintenance of it gas
main and distribution system in the City. The City
shall notify the said Company's representative within
five ( 5) days after the presentation of any claim or
demand either by suit or otherwise made against the
City on account of any negligence as aforesaid on the
part of said Company. The indemnity agreement hereinabove set forth shall obviate the Company's compliances with other city ordinances requiring the filing of
an indemnity bond for street excavations, or for laying,
maintenance, repair or operation by the Company of
its said gas distribution system hereunder.
Section 4. As a further consideration for this
franchise, the Company agrees to pay into the Treasury of the City a sum equal to two per cent ( 2%) of
the gross receipts derived by said Company from the
sale of gas for use within the corporate limits of Salt
Lake City.
The term "gross receipts'' as used herein shall be
construed to mean any receipts of the Company from
the sale of gas for use within Salt Lake City, after
adjustment for the net write-off of uncollectable accounts and adjustments or corrections of bills theretofore rendered.
\Vi thin twenty-five ( 25) days after the first day
of .January, April, July and October of each year, commencing with the year 1954, the Company will file with
the Treasurer of said City a report showing the gross
receipts as aboYe described for the preceding three calendar moths, which report shall, in addition to the
amount of gross receipts, show a computation of the
tax due. Coincidentally with the filing of such report,
the Company shall pay to the City Treasurer the amount
of the tax thus computed. The City Treasurer shall
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determine the accuracy of the tax computation and if he
finds any errors, he shall report the same to the Com.
puny for correetion. If the tax as paid is found to be
deficient, the Company shall promptly remit the difference, and if the tax as paid be found excessive, the Citv
shall promptly refund the difference. The records o'f
the Company pertaining to such report shall be
for
inspection by the lloard of Commissioners or its duly
authorized representative at all reasonable hours upo;1
the giving of reasonable notice of its intention to inspect
such records for the purpose of verifying such report.
Section 5. In consideration of the Company's making the payments hereinabove provided for in Section
4, it is expressly understood and agreed by the City
and the Company that the payments so provided in said
Section 4 hereof shall be in lieu of any and all other
franchise, occupation, privilege, license, excise, reve·
nue or similar taxes, and all other exactions (except
ad valorem property taxes and special assessments for
loeal improvements) upon the revenue, property, gas
mains, gas supply and distribution pipes, equipment,
fixtures ,or other appurtenances of said Company, and
all other property or equipment or said Company, or
any part thereof, including but not limited to any tax
levies, license fees, charges, assessments, fees or payments imposed and which heretofore have accrued or
hereafter would aecrue under and by that certain ordinance passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake City, Utah, on August 29, 1928, entitled, "AN
ORDINANCE GRANTING to John McFayden
and L. B. Denning, their successors and assigns, a franchise for the construction, operation and maintenance
of gas mains and supply pipes in the .C:ity of Salt i;;ake
and prescribing the terms and cond1t10ns there.of, to(J'ether with any amendments thereof and said payprovided· for in Section 4 hereof also shall be
in lieu of any tax levies, license, fees, charges, assess-
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men ts, fees or payments imposed and accruing from
and after October 1, 1953, under and by that certain
ordinance passed by the Hoard of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 10, 1952, entitled
"AN ORDINANCE A.MENDING CHAPTER
XXXY of the revised ordinances of Salt Lake City,
Ctah, 1U44, by adding in and to said chapter a new
section to be known as Section 3730, relating to the
licensing of persons or corporations who engage in the
selling of natural or artificial gas in Salt Lake City,
Ctah," together with any amendments thereof.
Section o. Upon the effective date of this ordinance passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake City, Utah, on August 29, 1928, entitled, "AN
ORDINANCE GRANTING to John Mc:Favden
and L. ll. Denning, their successors and assigns, a franchise for the construction, operation and maintenance
of gas mains and supply pipes in the City of Salt Lake
and prescribing the terms and conditions thereof," and
also that certain ordinance passed by the Board of
Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, on January
10, 1952, entitled, "AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER XXXV of the revised ordinances
of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944, by adding in and to said
chapter a new section to be known as Section 3730,
relating to the licensing of persons or corporations
who engage in the selling of natural or artificial gas
in Salt Lake City, Utah," together with all amendments of said ordinances or either of them, shall be
repealed and all benefits to or obligations of the Company thereunder shall cease and terminate.
Section 7. This ordinance shall be deposited in the
office of the City Recorder of Salt Lake City, Utah,
and published at least once in a newspaper published
within said City and shall go into effect at the expiration of the twentieth day after publication, or the thirtieth dav after its final passage, whichever of said days
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is the most remote from the final passage of this ordinance. The Company, within thirty ( 30) days after the
effective date of this ordinance shall file its acceptance
thereof in \\Titing with the City Recorder of Salt Lake
City, otherwise the same shall be null and void.
Passed and adopted by the Hoard of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, this 27th day of October,

1953.

(SEAL) Irma F. Bitner
City Recorder
BILL No. 65
Published October 30, 1953.

Earl J. Glade
Mayor

EXHIBIT "C"
AN ORDINANCE
AN ORDINANCE GRANTING TO UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS, AN ELECTRIC
LIGHT, HEAT, AND PO,VER FRANCHISE
AND REPEALING CERTAIN FRANCHISE
ORDINANCES HERETOFORE GRANTED
TO SAID COMP ANY AND/OR ITS PREDECESSOR
ANIES.
BE IT ORDAINED IlY THE IlOARD OF COM:l\1ISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE CITY,
UTAH:
Section 1. That there is hereby granted to Utah
Power & Light Company, its successors and assigns
(herein sometimes called the "Company"), the right.
privilege, or franchise for a period of fifty ( 50) years
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from and after January 1, 1951, to construct, maintain
and operate in, under, along, over and across the present
and future streets, alleys, and public places in Salt Lake
City, Utah (herein sometimes called the "City"), and its
successors, electric light and power lines, together with
all the necessary or desirable appurenances (including
underground conduits and structures, poles, towers,
wires, transmission lines, and telegraph and telephone
lines for its mvn use), for the purpose of supplying electric power and energy to said City, the inhabitants thereof and persons and corporations beyond the limits thereof, for light, heat, power and other purposes.
Sec. 2. All electric lines, poles, towers, conduits and
other structures constructed under this grant shall be
constructed and maintained in accordance with established practices with respect to such construction; and
shall be located so as to cause minimum interference with
the proper use of such streets, alleys and public places.
Sec. 3. The City shall have the right, without cost
to make attachments to poles owned and used by the
Company within the City for City wires used by the City
in connection with its fire alarm or police signal systems; such attachments to be installed and maintained
in accordance with the requirements of the National
Electric Safety Code pertaining to such construction,
and only after written notice to the Company; provided,
however, that the Company shall assume no liability nor
be put to any additional expense in connection therewith;
and, provided further, that the City's use thereof shall
be in such manner as not to interfere with the Company's
use of the same.
Sec. 4. The City shall in no way be liable or responsible for any accident or damage that may occur in
the construction, operation or maintenance by the Company of its lines and appurtenances hereunder, and the
of this franchise shall be deemed an agree-
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ment on the part of said Company, its successors anu
assigns, to indemnify said City and hold it
against any all liability, loss, cost, damage or expenst
which may accrue to said City by reason of the neglect
default or misconduct of the Company in the construe.
tion, operation or maintenance of its said lines and ap.
purtenances hereunder.
Sec. 5. As a further consideration for this franchise
and in lieu of all municipal occupation or license taxes
upon the Company its property or business within the
City, the Company agrees to pay a sum equal to two percentum ( 2 % ) on the gross revenue derived by the Company from the sale and use of electrical power and energy within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City.
The terms "gross revenue" as used herein shall be
construed to mean any revenue of the Company derived
from the sale and use of electric power and energy within Salt Lake City, after adjustment for the net write·
off of uncollectible accounts and corrections of bills theretofore rendered.
vVithin forty-fice days after the close of each quar·
ter in each calendar year, the Company shall file with
the City Treasurer of Salt Lake City, a report of such
gross revenues for such quarter. Such report shall con·
tain a statement of gross revenue and any deductions
made because of adjustments or corrections as herein
provided, together with a computation of the tax to be
paid. Coincidentally with the filing of such report the
Company shall pay to the City Treasurer the amount of
the tax thus computed. \Vithin thirty ( 30) days after
the filing of such report, or within such reasonable additional time as the City Treasurer may request, the Treas·
urer shall examine such report, determine the accuracy
of the amounts reported, and, if he finds any errors, re·
port the same to the Company for correction; if the tax
as paid be found deficient the Company shall promptly
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remit the difference, and if the tax as paid be found
excessiYe the City shall promptly refund the difference.
The records of the Company pertaining to such report
sha:l be open for inspection by the Board of Commissioners or by its duly authorized representative at all
reasonable hours for the purpose of verifying such report.

Sec. <>. This Ordinance shall be deposited in the
office of the City Recorder of Salt Lake City and published at least once in a newspaper published within said
City and shall go into effect at the expiration of the
twentieth day after publication or the thirtieth day after
its final passage, whichever of said dates is mose remote
from the final passage of said Ordinance.
Sec. 7. Utah Power & Light Company, within
thirty days after the effective date of this Ordinance
shall file its acceptance thereof in writing with the City
Recorder of Salt Lake City, otherwise the same shall be
null and void.
See. 8. Upon the filing with the City Recorder of
sueh written acceptance those certain Ordinances entitledAn Ordinance ratifying and confirming the
transfer of franchises to Utah Light and Railway
Company, a corporation, extending the life of said
franchise, and amending the same, including the franchise of the Utah Power Company. Passed by the City
Council of Salt Lake City, Utah, August 3, 1905;
and an Ordinance entitled:
An Ordinance ratifying and confirming the
transfer to the Utah Light and Traction Company,
its successors and assigns, of the rights, privileges and
franchises covered bv certain Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, amending said Ordinances and Reordaining the
same as so amended. Passed by the Board of Com-
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missioners of Salt Lake City, l.Jtah, December 21,
1914;

and an Ordinance entitled:
An Ordinance amending an Ordinance entitled:
"An Ordinance ratifying and confirming the transfer
to the Utah Light and Traction Company, its successors and assigns, of the rights, privileges and franchises covered by certain Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, amending said Ordinance and reordaining the
same as so amended," passed December 21, 1914.
Passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City, March 1, 1917;
and an Ordinance entitled:
An Ordinance ratifying and confirming the
transfer to the Utah Power and Light Company, its
successors and assigns, all the rights, privileges and
franchises covered by certain Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, and ratifying the same. Passed by the Board of
Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, February 6,
1945;

and an Ordinance entitled:

An Ordinance granting permission to the .Mer·
chants Light & Power Company, a corporation to
construct, maintain and operate an electric heating,
lighting and power system within the limits of Salt
Lake City. Passed by the Board of Commissioners of ,
Salt Lake City, Utah, August 22, 1912;
and an Ordinance entitled:
An Ordinance amending "An Ordinance grant·
ing permission to the l\Ierchants Light & Power Com·
pany, a corporation, to construct, maintain and
an electric heating, lighting and power system w1thm
the limits of Salt Lake City" passed August 22, 1912,
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reordaining the same as amended and confirming the
title thereto in the Utah Power & Light Company, its
successors and assigns. Passed by the lloard of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, December 21,
1914;

an<l an Ordinance entitled:
An Ordinance amending an Ordinance entitled:
n Ordinance granting permission to the :Merchants
Light & Power Company, a corporation, to construct,
maintain and operate an electric heating, lighting and
power system within the limits of Salt Lake City"
passed August 22, 1912, as amended by "An Ordinance granting permission to the :Merchants Light &
Power Company, a corporation, to construct, maintain
arnl operate an electric heating, lighting and power
system within the limits of Salt Lake City, passed
1\ugust 22, 1912, reordaining the same as amended,
and confirming the title thereto in the Utah Power &
Light Company, its successors and assigns," passed
December 21, 1914, to include the right to construct,
maintain and operate a system for the distribution and
eonyeyance of steam, hot water and other fluids and
air within the limits of Salt Lake City. Passed by the
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah,
)larch l, 1917;
"1 \

together with all amendments of said Ordinances or
either of them, insofar as they pertain to the furnishing
of electric power and energy in Salt Lake City, shall be
repealed and all benefits to or obligations of the Company thereunder shall cease and terminate.
Resening to the Company, however, the rights and
pririleges granted to said Company by the above-mentioned Ordinance passed March 1, 1917, to construct,
operate and maintain a system for the distribution and
of steam, hot water and other fluids and air
along.and under the streets, alleys and public ground in
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said City, an<l to construct and lay conduits below tht
surf ace of the ground, with all necessary branches, cut.
offs and manholes, and other apparatus, in such streeh
alleys and public grounds for the conveyance of steam
hot water and other fuids and air for power, heating
cooking or other useful applications, to the inhabitants.
property owners, manufacturers, and users in said City.
Passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake City, Ctah, this 16th day of January, 1951.
D. A. AFFLECK,
Temporary Chairman.
IRMA F. BITNER,
City Recorder.
(SEAL)
BILL NO. 4
Published January 18, 1951.

EXHIBIT "D"
AN ORDINANCE
AN ORDINANCE ADDING to Chapter 3, Title

20, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965,.

a new Section to be known as Section 20-3-14 relating to:
a utility revenue tax.
Be it ordained by the Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City, Utah:
SECTION I. There is hereby added to Title :20.
Chapter 3 of the Revised
of Salt
City.
Utah, If>65, the following Sect10n known as Section 20·
3-14 relating to a utility revenue tax to read as follows:
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"Sec.
Utility reveune tax. "THEREAS,
lhere is presently insufficient revenue available to Salt
Lake City to enable it to perform the necessary governmental services to its inhabitants, and an immediate
emergency exists requiring the city to obtain a new
source of revenue from a proposed tax under the Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax Ordinance of the City
of Salt Lake City, which cannot be obtained without additional enabling legislation which must be enacted by
the Legislature of the State of Utah, and
"rHEREAS, pending the passage of such enabling
legislation it is deemed necessary to obtain a temporary
source of revenue by the imposition upon the Telephone,
Gas, and Electric Companies doing business as public
utilities in Salt Lake City of a tax based upon the gross
revenue of said public utilities, received from the sales
an<l use of public utility services within the corporate
limits of the city, the amount of such tax to be collected
by said public utilities from their customers in Salt Lake
City and paid by said public utilities to the city as herein
provided, and
'VHEREAS, the city has heretofore entered into
franchise agreements with said public utilities operating
in Salt Lake City, which agreements provide for a franchise payment in lieu of any other occupation or franchise tax which might be imposed by the city. In view of
the existing financial emergency, the said public utilities,
without waiving their rights to enforce said provisions,
have been induced by the city to withhold the limitation
of an,IJ legal proceedings for such enforcement during
the period herein fixed for the emergency.

NO"r THEREFORE. During an emergency
period ending July 1, 1969, there is hereby levied upon
the business of the Telephone, Gas, and Electric Companies, doing business as public utilities, in Salt Lake
an annual license tax equal to two percentum (2%)
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of the gross revenues derived from the sale and use of
public utility services by said companies in the corporate
limits of Salt Lake City.
The term "gross revenue" as used herein shall be
construed to mean revenue derived from the sale and use
of public utility services within Salt Lake City after ad.
justment for net write-off of uncollectible accounts and
corrections of bills theretofore rendered, and particular·
ly the term "gross revenue" as applied to Telephom
Companies shall be construed to mean all basic local exchange service revenue received from subscribers located
within the City of Salt Lake City and directly connected
with the switchboard or switchboards of such companies
located in the city.
"Public utility services" shall mean the sale and use
of electrical po,ver and energy, natural gas and local
exchange telephone service.
\Vithin forty-five days after the close of each quar·
ter in a calendar year, any public utility taxed under this
Section shall file with the City Treasurer of Salt Lake
City a report of its gross revenues derived from the sale
and use of public utility services in Salt Lake City and
any deductions because of adjustments or corrections
made as herein provided, together with a computation of
the tax collected from its customers as herein provided.
Coincident with the filing of such report, the company
shall pay to the City Treasurer the amount of the tax."
SECTION 2. In the opinion of the Board of Com·
missioners, it is necessary to the peace, health, and wel·
fare of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City, Utah, that this
ordinance become effective as provided in Section 3 here·
of and remain in effect during the period ending July 1.
1969.

SECTION 3. This ordinance shall take effect upon
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I
I

the billings by said public utilities to their customers
dated on August 1, 1967.

Passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake City, lJtah, this 29th day of June, 1967.
GEORGE B. CATMULL,
Commissioner
LOUIS E. HOLLEY,
Commissioner
HER.MAN J. HOGEXSEN
City Recorder
(SEAL)
BILL NO. 38 of 1967
Published June 30, 1967
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EXHIBIT "E"
AN ORDINANCE
AN ORDINANCE

Section 20-3-

U of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,

1965, passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake City the 29th day of June, 1967, Bill No. 38 of
Hl67, relating to a utility revenue tax, upon gross receipts of Telephone, Gas and Electric Companies doing
business as public utilities in Salt Lake City.
Be it ordained by the Board of
Salt Lake City, Utah:

of

SECTION I. That Section 20-3-14 of the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, passed by the
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, the 29th dav
of June, 1967, Bill No. 38 of 1967, relating to a utility
revenue tax, upon gross receipts of Telephone, Gas and
Electric Companies doing business as public utilities in
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Salt Lake City, be, and the same hereby is, amended tu
read as follows :
"Sec. 20-3-14. Utility Revenue 1 1a11.\ There is here·
by levied upon the business of very person or compam
engaged in the business in Salt Lake City, Utah, of sup.
plying telephone, gas or electric energy service as public
utilities, an annual License ta.i' equal to two per centum
of the gross revenue derived from the sale and use of the
senices of said utilities within the corporate limits of
Salt Lake City.
"The term 'gross revenue,' as used herein, shall be
construed to mean the reveune derived from the sale and
use of public utility services within Salt Lake City, pro·
vided that 'gross reveune' as applied to the telephone
utility shall be construed to mean basic local exchange
senice revenue received from subscribers located within
Salt Lake City and directly connected with the switch·
board or switchboards of said utility located in the city.
" 'Public Utility Services' shall mean the sale and
use of electrical power and energy, natural gas and local
exchange telephone service.
"'Vithin forty-five days after the close of each quar·
ter in a calendar year, any public utility taxed hereunder
shall file with the city treasurer of Salt Lake City a re·
port of its gross revenue derived from the sale and use
of public utility services in Salt Lake City as
herein, together with a computation of the tax levied
hereunder against the utility. Coincident with the filing
of such report, the utility shall pay to the city treasurer
the amount of the tax."
SECTION 2. In the opinion of the Board of Com·
missioners of Salt Lake City it is necessary to the peace,
health and welfare of the inhabitants of Salt Lake
Utah, that this ordinance become effective immediately
and remain in effect
the period ending July 1,
1969.
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SECTION 3. This ordinance shall take effect
upon its first publication.
Passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake City, Gtah, this 24th day of April, 1968.

(SEAL)

J. BRACKEN LEE
Mayor
HERMAN HOGENSEN
City Recorder

llILL NO. 39 of 1968
Published .May 1, 1968
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EXHIBIT "F"
AN ORDINANCE
AN ORDINANCE Extending the time during
which the Utility Revenue Tax imposed by Section 20il-U of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
1965, as enacted and amended by Bill No. 38 of 1968,
shall remain in full force and effect.

Be it ordained by the Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City, Utah:
SECTION 1. That the Utility Revenue Tax imposed by Section 20-3-14 of the Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, as enacted and amended by
Bill No. 38 of 1967 and Bill No. 39 of 1968, be, and the
same hereby is, deemed necessary to the peace, health
and welfare of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City, Utah,
and, therefore, said ordinance is continuing in full force
and effect until July 1, 1970.
SECTION 2. In the opinion of the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City it is necessary to the peace,
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health and welfare of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City,
Utah, that this ordinance become effective immediate!)·
SECTION 3. This ordinance shall take effect up.
on its first publication.
Passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City, Utah, this :24th day of June, 1969.
J. BRACKEN LEE
Mayor
?vULDRED Y. HIGHA.M
Chief Deputy City Recorder
(SEAL)
BILL NO. 60 of 1969
Published June 27, 1969
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EXHIBIT "G"
AN ORDINANCE
AN ORDINANCE EXTENDING the time
during which the Utility Revenue Tax imposed by Sec·
tion 20-3-14 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake!
City, Utah, 1965, as enacted and amended by Bill No.
38 of 1967 and Bill No. 39 of 1968, shall remain in full
force and effect.

Be it ordained by the Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City, Utah:
SECTION 1. That the Utility Revenue Tax im·
posed by Section 20-3-14 of the Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake Citv, Utah, 1965, as enacted and amended by
Bill No. 38o{1967 and Bill No. 39 of lfl68, be, and the
same hereby is, deemed necessary to the peace, health
and welfare of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City, Utah.
and, therefore, said ordinance is continued in f{1II force
and effect until July 1, 1971.
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SECTION 2. In the opinion of the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City it is necessary to the peace,
health and welfare of the inhabitants of Salt Lake Citv,
l'tah, that this ordinance become effective immediately.
SECTION 3. This ordinance shall take effect up-

on its first publication.

Passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City, Ctah, this 30th day of June, 1970.
J. BRACKEN LEE,
Mayor.
HERMAN J. HOGENSEN,
Citv Recorder.
(SEAL)
Bill No. 63 of 1970
(A-99)
Published June 30, 1970
EXHIBIT "H"

1

1

VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
David E. Salisbury
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
328-8711

THE :MOUNTAIN STATES
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
COMPANY, a Corporation;
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY
COMP ANY, a Corporation; and
UTAH PO,VER & LIGHT
CO MP ANY, a Corporation,
Plaintif.fs,
v.
SALT LAKE CITY, a Body
Corporate and Politic Under the Laws
of the State of Ptah.
Defendant.
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Complaint
Civil No.
192098

Plaintiffs complain of Defendant and allege as fol
lows:

I.
Plaintiff, The Mountain States Telephone
Telegraph Company, a Colorado corporation, qualifiea
to do business in the State of lJtah, operates a telephom
system in Salt Lake City, Utah and elsewhere.

II.
Plaintiff, .Mountain Fuel Supply Company, a Utan
corporation, operates a gas supply system in Salt Lakt
City, Utah and elsewhere.

III.
Plaintiff, Utah Power & Light Company, a Maine
corporation, qualified to do business in the State o!
Utah, operates an electrical power system in Salt Lake
City, Utah and elsewhere.

IV.
Defendant, Salt Lake City, is a body Corporate
and Politic organized under the laws of the State at
Utah.

v.
During the Hl50' s, Defendant sought to raise additional revenue for city purposes through an increase in
the payments made by Plaintiffs for the exercise of their
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franchise rights. Pursuant to negotiations, the Defendant offered new franchises extending beyond previous
expiry dates, providing for substantially higher payments equal to 2 % of utility gross revenue derived from
saks within the City and containing provisions setting
forth the City's agreement that such new higher payments were "in lieu" of all other taxes, charges and impositions upon the revenue of the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs agreed, and new franchises were issued and aceepted. Copies of Defendant's Ordinances, Bill No. 78
of 1951, which sets forth the Franchise Agreement with
The l\Iountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company; Bill No. 65 of 1953, which sets forth the Franehise Agreement with Mountain Fuel Supply Company; and Bill No. 4 of 1951, which sets forth the Franehise Agreement with Utah Power & Light Company,
are attached hereto as Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" respectively and by this reference made a part hereof.

VI.
On June 29, 1967, Defendant passed an emergency
Ordinance, Bill No. 38 of 1967, imposing an additional
two percentum imposition against each of Plaintiff's
utility gross revenue in contravention of the above described "in lieu" contractual provisions. Attached hereto
as Exhibit "D" and by this reference made a part hereof
is a copy of said Ordinance. Said Ordinance was subsequently amended on April 24, 1968 by Bill No. 39 of
Hlfi8, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "E"
and by this reference made a part hereof. The tax imA-27

posed thereby is hereinafter referred to as the "Addi.
tional Utility Revenue Tax."

VII.
Inasmuch as the Additional Utility Revenue Tax
\vas characterized and explained as an emergency meas·
ure, Plaintiffs, without waiving their rights to enforce
the "in lieu" provisions in their Franchise Agreements.
were induced by the Defendant to withhold the initiation
of any legal proceedings for such enforcement during
the emergency period ending July 1, 1969.

VIII.
Despite the characterization of said tax as a tempo·
rary emergency measure, the Additional Utility Reve·
nue Tax, as amended, was extended by Defendant on
June 24, 1969 by Bill No. 60 of 1969 until July 1, 1970.

IX.

I
I

Prior to February 15, 1970 each of the Plaintiffs
paid under protest the last quarterly payments for 1969
of the Additional Utility Revenue Tax.

x.
Plaintiffs hereby allege that said tax is invalid in
respect to Plaintiffs because it is contrary to the express
provisions of their Franchise Agreements executed by
Defendant and is discriminatory as to Plaintiffs in con·
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ldi. travention of Section 10-8-80, Utah Code Annotated
(1953), Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution,
and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the
Gnited States of America.
I

ax

as.

XI.

Defendant contends that the Additional Utility
ts. Revenue Tax is valid in respect to the Plaintiffs and
on that the Plaintiffs are obligated to pay such tax.

tlg

XII.

By reason of the contentions of Plaintiffs and Defendant, a justiciable controversy exists between Plain0· tiffs and Defendant regarding the construction, force
e· and effect of the above described Franchise Agreements
JD and of the Ordinances which impose the Additional UtilO. ity Revenue Tax. Plaintiffs, pursuant to Title 78,
Chapter 33, Utah Code Annotated (1953), invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court to declare and determine the
l's construction and validity of said Agreements and Or19
dinances and the rights of the parties with respect
thereto.

vVHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray:
I. That a declaratory judgment be made and en-

n tered herein determining the validity and construction
;s of and the rights of the parties under the said Ordinances
y and Franchise Agreements and particularly that the
1·
ordinances imposing the Additional Utility Revenue
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Ta xare inYalid as applied to Plaintiffs and that Plairr
tiffs are not obligated to pay the tax imposed thereb)
2. For such other and further relief as the Cour

deems appropriate.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORN'V ALL & lHcCARTH\
David E. Salisbury
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Plaintiffs' Addresses:
The Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company
70 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Moutain Fuel Supply Company
P. 0. Box 11368
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Utah Power & Light Company
1407 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
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